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Abstract 
 Humans have built a society based upon elaborate social interactions. We have processes 
that enable us to interact with each other and switch between tasks. Humans often multitask 
especially in a social context, such as talking while working on a project, listening to someone 
while driving, or switching between conversations with different people. One of these processes 
that aids in this interaction is the intentional stance. The intentional stance is the tendency 
a  a     a  a      a  a , , a  . 
In this experiment, it is examined whether or not social cognition, such as inferring the beliefs or 
intentions of others, behaves like other cognitively dominant tasks. Cognitively dominant tasks 
are automatic processes that are elicited with minimal to no effort, such as reading. A task 
switching paradigm was used among two groups, social and non-social, where tasks in the social 
group invoke the intentional stance and tasks in the non-social group do not. Switch cost, the 
increase in reaction time when switching between tasks, may increase when switching from a 
hard task to an easier task. This is due to the amount of inhibition initially placed on the easier 
stimuli in order to attend to the cued, more difficult stimulus until the more readily available 
stimulus has become relevant again Based on previous research, it is believed that switching 
from a non-social to a social task will result in a greater switch cost due to the amount of effort 
needed to overcome inhibition initially placed on the more readily available stimuli, or the social 
stimuli. These findings would support the hypothesis that social cognitive process behave 
similarly to other cognitively dominant processes.  
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Introduction 
Humans are extremely social beings with even more complex social behaviors. They 
have a social relationship with their environment that heavily influences individual behavior and 
may be adaptively predisposed to engage in social cognitive processes. Numerous cognitive 
 a     a   a a   a    . Task switching 
a a  a  a  a  a   a    attention between tasks by 
comparing reaction ti   a . F  a ,  A , A a , a  Ca  2003 
study on similarity effects, participants were presented with a rectangle that varied in dimension 
a  . T  ,  ,  ,  ,   ,  a  to which 
characteristic of the rectangle participants would respond. Trials could repeat by asking 
a a     a  a  a    a ,  a       a 
row. Alternatively, trials may switch and cue a different task than the one before. Switching from 
one task to another evokes a switch cost. Switch cost describes the   a  a  
that results in a delay in reaction time for that trial. Previous studies show that task-switching 
increases both reaction times and error rates when compared to repeat trials (Arrington, Altmann, 
& Carr, 2003). Alternating between tasks results in a time-consuming executive control process, 
and the brain must reconfigure the task-set in order to produce the correct response (Strobach, 
Wendt, & Janczyk, 2018).  
 Executive functions are voluntary, consciously controlled processes that help regulate 
cognition such as inhibitory control, updating working memory, and shifting. Though executive 
functions are typically considered effortful, an increasing amount of evidence proposes that 
executive functions may be automatically triggered even in social context (Dudarev & Hassin, 
2016). Research also shows that there exists a positive correlation between executive control 
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functioning and Theory of Mind (ToM, sometimes called mentalizing) skills, where executive 
control might be a prerequisite for mental state inferences (Saxe, Schulz, & Jiang, 2006). Social 
cognition processes are mediated by the Theory of Mind network, a group of brain regions that 
control the interpretation of intentions, desires, perspectives, and   a     
own emotions. The Theory of Mind network is vital to the development of behavior 
interpretation and prediction (Gweon & Saxe, 2013). Developing accurate representations of 
social interactions allows one to adjust their behaviors accordingly.  
 One important aspect of this type of social processing is the intentional stance. The 
intentional stance is when individuals interpret the behavior of others based on the idea that their 
actions are governed by intentions, beliefs, and other mental states (Dennett, 2009). The 
intentional stance can apply to varying forms of communication, such as facial expressions, 
speech, general actions, and hand gestures (Kelly et al., 2007, Pavlova, 2011). Although 
processes like determining how to act on communicative stimuli were largely considered to be 
high-level and intentional, how we process incoming social information may possibly be 
automatic. 
 As more studies of the Theory of Mind network have been published, it has become 
increasingly apparent that there is an overlap between parts of the Default Mode Network 
(DMN) and regions activated during tasks that ask participants to infer belief and intentions of 
others (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2014, Spunt et al., 2015). The DMN is an interconnected group of 
brain regions that are active when participants undergoing functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI) are resting without focusing on any given task (Buckner et al., 2008). Functional 
magnetic resonance imaging is used to measure brain activity by measuring blood oxygen level 
dependent (BOLD) signals, blood oxygenation and flow, in the brain. The DMN has been 
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observed to primarily consist of the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), temporoparietal junction 
(TPJ), dorsomedial PFC (dmPFC), as well as a few other subsystems identified in numerous 
neuroimaging studies (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2014). The mPFC has been found to play a crucial 
role in the social understanding of other individuals, or the comprehension of social cues and 
feelings of empathy, while the TPJ is crucial for attributing mental states, the process of 
     a         (L   
al., 2014, Mars et al., 2012). The DMN shows patterns of deactivation during tasks requiring 
external attention, such as attending to people in our social world (Anticevic et al., 2012).  
 Tasks in studies that observe DMN activation related to the intentional stance include 
determining the emotional expressions of facial stimuli, asking participants what they would do 
when faced with a moral dilemma, punishing individuals for violating social norms, and a 
multitude of other techniques (Atique et al., 2011; Padmanabhan et al., 2017; Pujol et al., 2011). 
The overlap in the physical networking of both the DMN and social processing may suggest 
some sort of functional relatedness. Andrews-Hanna and colleagues predicted that self-generated 
thoughts, or those which are directed internally like recalling memories and mind wandering, 
produced by the DMN prepare individuals for social events (2014). A recent study from Meyer, 
Davachi, Oschner, and Lieberman in 2018 suggested that mPFC and TPJ activity during rest 
allows for automatic consolidation of new social information. Thoughts are often future-focused 
or involve some form of goal-oriented, autobiographical planning. Thus, DMN activity from this 
a   a   a a  a      a  a , a  
 , a      a .  
 Humans have constructed an elaborate social network in our environment. Because of the 
emphasis placed on social interaction, it is believed that social intention may behave like other 
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dominant cognitive processes. The purpose of this study is to examine how social intention 
affects task representation and what other aspects of task similarity affect task switching, as well 
as how social intention compares to other cognitively-dominant processes. Understanding the 
a  a  a    a    a   a   
thoughts, actions, and personalities. Psychotherapies can be focused to possibly aid individuals 
with different neurological disorders, such as schizophrenia or autism, both of which may affect 
the acquisition of social skills. Our lab proposes a hierarchical task switching paradigm of non-
social and social tasks, in which participants make social judgments on the intentions of 
individuals, given an image of an actor reaching for different objects. The described task-
switching paradigm will test the hypothesis that social processing is automatic, and the study will 
provide behavioral support for intentional stance priming. 
 
Literature Review 
A social approach to task-switching has been severely underrepresented in literature, 
despite task-switching being an extremely popular subject of research. Over 730,000 studies with 
task-switching as a key word have been published in the last 10 year. Typical task-switching 
paradigms have two possible trials, a repeat (nonswitch) condition or a switch condition. When 
an individual must switch over from one task to another, it requires additional cognitive 
processes than if the individual were continuing with the same task (Kiesel et al., 2010). Task 
transitioning results in an increase of reaction time for the switch trial, where the switch cost 
quantifies this as the difference in reaction time between repeat trials and switch trial. For 
example, switch cost may occur when asking consecutive questions about a rectangle s height; 
but if this is followed by a question asking about the rectangles hue, reaction time increases. 
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Dominance of a task is best demonstrated by the Stroop Task, where participants were 
simultaneously presented with conflicting stimuli: the name of a color with the font in the ink of 
a different color (Stroop, 1992). Participants were asked to say the color of the word, and not to 
read the printed word. During trials where the ink of the word matched the word itself, reaction 
times were significantly faster than trials where the ink did not match the word. Reading is a 
dominant process that demands very little attention or working memory, and improves through 
practice or repetition. This automatic behavior interferes when asked to identify the color stimuli 
compared to the word stimuli while completing the Stroop Task. 
A task transition requires additional cognitive processes. One might expect that switching 
from a hue trial to a height trial would result in the same switch cost as switching from a height 
trial to a hue trial, however; this is not always the case (Arrington, Altmann, & Carr, 2003; 
Kiesel et al., 2010). A symmetric switch cost occurs when the reaction time difference is the 
same no matter which task is switched to or from. An asymmetric switch cost arises when one 
task within a task pair is more dominant or easier. Neural mechanisms that arise when switching 
between tasks of unequal dominance, such as inhibitory and endogenous control, lead to a 
asymmetric differences in reaction times, or an asymmetric switch cost. Reversed asymmetry is 
when switching to the easier task incurs a smaller switch cost. Researchers commonly agree that 
in reversed asymmetric switch cost cases there may exist some sustained activation or 
endogenous priming that produces a smaller switch cost (Allport & Wylie, 1999; Schneider & 
Anderson, 2010). The easier task representation facilitates improved performance which leads to 
a smaller mean switch cost. Typically, one would assume that switching to an easier task would 
result in a decrease in reaction time compared to the previous trial, but this is uncommon. The 
most common type of asymmetry, surprising asymmetry, happens when a larger switch cost 
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occurs when switching to an easier task; this is unintuitive to what one would expect to happen 
when switching to an easier task. It is believed that the reason for this is due to sustained 
inhibition of the dominant task set, or the task-set inertia, the participant must inhibit the readily 
available easy task, and in turn, the large amount of inhibition takes more time to overcome for 
the easier task (Allport, Styles, & Hsieh, 1994). Using the Stroop task as another example, 
a a     a  a , a   , a     a  
task of saying the color of the word. Generally, in order to perform well on a harder task, one 
must strongly inhibit the readily available easy task. When an individual is cued to pay attention 
to the easy task after a period of forcibly not focusing on the irrelevant information, it takes 
considerably more time to overcome the inhibition when it is relevant again. 
Other studies aim to explain asymmetry through task similarity rather than inhibition or 
priming. In Arringt  , a a   a   -choice discrimination tasks 
a  , , , a   (2003). H  a      a  
   a   a    a    a  . The 
similarity in task components affect the cognitive processes required for task switching. Though 
asking the height of the rectangle is different than asking about the width, they still share 
attentional control aspects that focus on the dimension of the rectangle. Dually, hue and 
brightness are two different tasks but both inquire about the color of the rectangle. Using the task 
similarity approach, trials that switch between similar task can conceptually be considered a 
repeat trial for either color or dimension even though it is a switch trial for the task itself. Task 
similarity had a statistically significant effect on switch cost, where switching between similar 
tasks resulted in 61 milliseconds faster mean reaction times compared to switch costs between 
dissimilar tasks (Arrington, Altmann, & Carr, 2003). Task similarity explains the magnitude of 
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the differences in reaction times, while task set inertia focuses on the pattern due to the 
differences in dominance of the tasks.  
 This raises the question: Are there other components to task switching that affect switch 
cost? Society puts a massive emphasis on social relations that we navigate using task switching. 
Individuals interact with other people who have different beliefs, thoughts, and ideas that they 
must infer. People switch between their own mental state and inferring others  when interacting 
with those around them. Humans inherently take on an intentional stance, a strategy used to 
interpret the behaviors of others that are guided by intentions, beliefs, and other mental states 
(Dennett, 2009). The Default Mode Network becomes active during periods where cognitive 
activity declines which can be observed using an fMRI to measure BOLD signals in correlated 
regions of the brain (Buckner et al., 2008). The medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) is a key region 
of the DMN but also serves a role in social perceptions, for example, understanding others and 
emotional engagement (Li et al., 2014). The mPFC is one subregion of the mentalizing network, 
or the Theory of Mind network, which is a network responsible for inferring mental states of 
other humans, such as their desires, intentions, and beliefs (Saxe, 2009).  
Only recently has investigation into the relatedness of the DMN and mentalizing network 
begun to produce promising results explaining their interconnectedness. In 2015, Spunt et al. 
found that baseline DMN activity among individuals, primarily the dorsomedial prefrontal 
cortex, predicted ease of implementing the intentional stance and reduced, accurate response 
time towards social stimuli.  Pa a   S    a  yes  or no  questions 
related to mind-focused, body-focused, and math-based stimuli. In mind-focused trials, 
participants were to infer the correct answer from the statement. For example, in a mind-focused 
a  a  a   a  a  a    a    a    a  
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 a  e participant would state whether or not they agree. For the body-focused trial, 
a   a    a       a  a   a a    
teeth. Non-social judgments, or math equations, were also presented and asked if simple 
mathematical equations were correct or not. Mind-focused trials were found to provoke the 
intentional stance, while body-focused trials did not. Greater DMN activity during the fixation 
period before mind-focused trials corresponded with faster reaction times on subsequent trials. 
Even though participants produced more accurate and faster responses for body-focused trials 
than mind-focused, this priming effect only existed for the mind-focused trials.  
Our lab proposes to use task switching paradigm between social and non-social stimuli to 
test whether intentional stance processing is a dominant process (and thus require more 
inhibition to switch away from). Because our hypothesis is that the intentional stance will act 
similarly to other dominant processes and require a larger amount of inhibition to overcome, we 
expect that a larger switch cost will occur when switching from a non-social to a social task.  
  




After written informed consent is obtained, 150 subjects will be recruited for the 
experiment  G a I   T  SONA a . Participants will be 
randomly assigned into either the social group or the Non-Social group. Participants will 
complete a task switching procedure that contains social or Non-Social stimuli. Participants will 
be randomly assigned to either the social stimuli group, which will compare data from both 
social and non-social trials, or a non-social control group that contains only non-social stimuli. 
Before each block, a visual summary table will be presented to the participants. 
 
Figure 1: Visual Summary Table. The figure shows the visual summary table presented to the 
Social group. The Non-Social group will not be shown the Goal column. 
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 During the trials, participants will see a fixation cross for 500ms followed by a static 
image of a hand reaching for a colored box with an item inside. The images and cues will stay on 
the screen for up to 2900ms during the response period and will be followed by a blank, black 
screen for 100ms. Grasping positions of the hands will cha  a     a . 
For example, reaching for a knob will have a different grasp than reaching for a handle. 
However, the handles will not be visible during the trials themselves. Participants have one of 
four possible cued tasks that they will have to complete for each trial. These tasks will change 
depending on whether they are in the Social group or Non-Social group. Both groups will be 
asked to make judgements on the brightness, light or dark, and color, green or blue, of the box. 
The chosen colors and design a  A  2003 al procedure. Color and 
brightness tasks do not invoke the intentional stan  a  a   - a  a . T  
intentional stance provoking stimuli will ask participants to infer goals and actions. The table 
informs participants that there are two goals, with two actions needed to complete each goal. For 
example, to go for a walk outside one must obtain both the water bottle from a drawer and their 
 
Figure 2: Trial Design. The figure shows what a trial would look like for the participant. 
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shoes from behind a door. The table ensures that there is one objectively correct answer for each 
Goal trial and Action trial. As previously stated, the handles will not be shown for the trials. 
Participants will have to infer from the grasping action how the stimulus is interacting with the 
box object. The participant will have to remember where a certain item is or how the hand is 
positioned to open either a door or a drawer. For a task goal, objects are always associated with 
 a   a a   . B  A  a  G a  a  a     . 
Items and Goals change each block so that participants do not memorize any information and 
make associations that do not require inference of social intention. Participants will make 
judgements on either the task that the image is portraying or the action itself. The Goal task may 
  ,  owing a hand reaching for a sock drawer, while the Action task is 
a    a .  
For the non-social group, goal and action tasks will not be asked, but instead more 
questions about the image itself will be cued. These will not ask the participant to infer any 
intentions but will ask about the size of the image and its orientation. For example, the standard 
stimulus size may be noticeably smaller. Similarly, the orientation of the image may flip showing 
the hand approaching the box from either side. Size and orientation will not change at all in the 
a   . Pa a    -social group will also be provided a visual 
summary table but will not be shown the goal column. Non-social tasks that still show these 
images act as a control for the social group to account for a a a   a  to 
automatically process social intent even at a more abstract level without being provided any 
cues. 
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To input their answers, participants will use two button boxes, each having four buttons. 
For both groups, the index finger will be used to select rectangle hue and the middle finger will 
be used to differentiate color. In the social group, the ring finger will be used to select the action 
(opening a drawer or opening a door) and the pinky will select the task (going for a walk or 
getting dressed).  In the non-social group, the ring finger will be used to select the size of the 
rectangle cue (large or small) and the pinky will select the side the cue appears on (left or right). 
Prompts as to which response is required will appear above fixation cross before the stimulus 
a a . F  a ,   C   a a  above the fixation cross, the rectangle will 
be shown, then based on whether the rectangle is tall or short, the participant will use their 
       .  
 
Figure 3: Orientation with Button Boxes. The figure shows how a participant will orient their 
hands. 
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Trials will be a mixture of repeat and switch trials. Repeat trials will ask about the same 
stimuli attribute, such as asking about the color of the stimuli for two sequential trials. The color 
between trials may change, but this is still considered a repeat trial because the question being 
asked does not change. Switch trials will ask about a different attribute.  
The design of this experiment compares tasks based on similar components, such as the 
intentional task set as well as the color task set. Color and hue trials are grouped under the color 
task set, while action and goal tasks are considered part of the intentional task set. Non-social 
questions that ask about the image size and orientation are part of the image task set. The image 
task set is comparable to the intentional task set in that both share similar perceptual encoding. 
This way, the influence of social intention and how it affects task representation by comparing 
switch costs is easier to analyze. 
 
Figure 4: Finger Orientation. The figure shows which finger responds to each stimulus 
prompt. 
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Behavioral Data Acquisition and Analysis 
 Variables of interest include response time, accuracy, task, task type, trial type, and 
switch trial type data which will be collected on a computer using Eprime  software. The task 
       a    a , a   a    
whether or not the cue is social or non-social. The trial type will either be non-switch, or 
congruent with the previous trial, or switch, where the questions between trials will switch from 
a social to a non-social question or vice versa (switch trial type). The variables that will be 
analyzed are response time, accuracy, and switch cost. A repeated measures ANOVA will be 
used to test for effects between, task, task type, trial type, and switch trial type on switch cost, 
accuracy, and response time. Outliers, data that is not within 3 standard deviations of the mean 
response time, will be excluded from the analysis in order to avoid skewing the data. 
 
Discussion and Broader Impacts 
 The current design allows similar tasks to be grouped together based on their content. 
This way, it is possible to analyze the influence of social intention on task representations by 
comparing the patterns between switch cost. Both color and image task sets will be compared to 
intentional task sets. It is expected that the non-social group will have an asymmetric switch cost 
between non-social color tasks and non-social image tasks where the image task set will have 
greater mean reaction times. Because social processing is predicted to be a dominant process that 
will require inhibition, switching to the non-social image tasks from a non-social color task will 
require more time to overcome the inhibition. Switch cost should partially be compensated by 
the task similarity effect. Size and orientation are also more complex variables than hue and 
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brightness, and thus are expected to have increased reaction times. The non-social group is 
essentially a replication of Arrington  a -similarity study, and acts as a control for the social 
group. Similar results  A   a  a  ,  a  a 61    
between task sets. As proposed by Spunt, mental state inferencing would act more dominantly 
due to the priming effect of the DMN (2015). A disproportionate amount of inhibition would be 
required in order to correctly answer a non-social task, but would be even more difficult to 
overcome the inhibition when social inferencing is once again relevant.  
 Executive functions are effortful and require a majority of our mental resources; 
however, if social tasks unconsciously recruit execute functioning, then there may exist some 
evidence that social intent is a dominant process. The reason might be due to an evolutionary 
development; that humans are pre-adaptively attuned to social cognition. An asymmetric switch 
cost would also provide behavioral evidence of priming for the intentional stance. This process is 
heavily associated with mental state reasoning but may also serve as an adaptive function for 
humans. Results from this study may distinguish a biological basis for individuals to adopt the 
intentional stance as an effect of living in a social world.   
Results would be consistent with existing studies, and that executive control is likely 
required to infer the intentions of others while simultaneously acting automatically. Task set 
a,  A  1994 study, explains the asymmetric cost pattern between social and non-
social stimuli, due to sustained inhibition of the dominant task set. In this study, social tasks were 
considered to be dominant and autonomous. The difficulty in surpassing this repression is one of 
the reasons we expect greater switch cost. It is also expected that similar tasks will have 
minimum switch cost due to shared cognitive components and attentional control processes 
(Arrington, 2003). 
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A a   a   a  a  a a  a   a a    a  
environment. Humans are raised via the processes underlying the intentional stance. From early 
childhood, they attempt to explain the behavior of others, and by the time humans reach 
adulthood they are experts in mental attribution. Adopting the intentional stance in social 
situations is autonomous and a readily available strategy. Others are automatically viewed as 
having motivations driven by beliefs and ideas. By being able to identify under which conditions 
humans take on the intentional stance and the mechanisms behind social inferencing, can lead 
the way to significant everyday developments. Whether it be through more targeted therapies for 
individuals with social cognitive deficits or analyzing how a human may adopt the intentional 
stance towards a robot, being able to apply the process of mental attribution paves a path for 
future innovation.  
Though there is ample evidence of the physical overlap between the DMN and Theory of 
Mind network, there exists little literature that delves into the functional relatedness of the two 
systems. Future experiments should determine functional relatedness through fMRI diagnostics. 
Determining the neurophysiological and functional overlap of the DMN and higher level social 
cognitive processes is a gap in current literature that requires further attention. Researchers are 
now interested in observing functional connectivity (FC), the temporal correlation of 
spontaneous BOLD signals between brain regions; as well as effective connectivity (EC), or the 
influence of one neural structure over another, of the DMN and mentalizing network (Wierenga 
et al., 2015; Stephan & Friston, 2010). Kim and colleagues found that fMRI data from low-
empathy individuals, individuals that typically have a lack of emotional intelligence and do not 
pick up on social or emotional cues from others, demonstrated lower FC of the mPFC and 
anterior cingulate cortex in the DMN (Kim et al., 2017). These results imply that empathy, an 
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important social process required for responding appropriately to different social states, is related 
to the DMN. However, using FC methods is complicated due to single brain regions being 
utilized in various different processes; concurrently, the more complex a process is the higher the 
chance that it will recruit several brain regions (Poldrack, 2011). For example, subregions of the 
mPFC conduce specialized functions based upon their different roles in subsystems of the DMN; 
the ventral mPFC is correlated with emotion engagement, the anterior mPFC allows for the 
distinction between self and others, and  a  PFC      a  
states (Li et al., 2014). Different tasks from each of these fields have demonstrated some level of 
connectivity with the DMN, and as task complexity increased so did involvement of related 
regions of the medial frontal cortex (Li et al., 2014).  
Dysfunction of the DMN has also been associated with poor social skills, for example, in 
a study that observed patients with moderate-severe traumatic brain injury (TBI), it was found 
that resting-state functional connectivity strength in the DMN could predict social cognition 
a  (L a a   a ., 2019). I  L a a  , a   a TBI   
recognize emotion as accurately as the neurotypical group. This modified pattern of DMN 
activity is consistent with findings focusing on individuals with disorders such as depression, 
autism, and schizophrenia, all of which demonstrate some form of social cognition deficit (Fox et 
al., 2017; Jung et al., 2014; Sambataro et al., 2013). Individuals that possessed traits linked to the 
autism spectrum were shown to have demonstrated lower functional connectivity in the DMN 
during resting state; however the research did not express if this pattern was limited to individual 
differences amongst those with autism or if opposite patterns could apply to those of the 
neurotypical population (Jung et al., 2014). Through both neurotypical as well as atypical 
studies, DMN activity is directly correlational to social functioning. Controlled modulation of the 
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DMN through mindfulness, a method of therapy that aims to promote thoughtfulness and 
acceptance of oneself, and meditation are beneficial to those with depression, anxiety, and 
schizophrenia (Simon & Engstrom, 2015). If evidence is found that the DMN primes for the 
mentalizing network, it may identify subsystems of interest as possible therapeutic targets for 
individuals with social cognition deficits. 
Though this study emphasizes the possible ramifications that could assist in targeting 
therapies for individuals with specific social cognitive deficits such as TBI, depression, and 
autism; it could also be used as a baseline to understanding different social priming among 
diverse cultures and societies. Previous studies show differences in brain volume dependent on 
socio-cultural orientation (Huang et al., 2019). Is social priming a relative constant among all 
cultures or is it dependent on the society in which individuals live in? Having a better 
understanding of possible unique social priming may advance communication capabilities above 
the traditional verbal and physical level.  
 
Conclusion 
In this study, the influence of social intention on task switching will be observed and tested 
the hypothesis that social processing is dominant and automatic will be tested. It will provide 
behavioral support for intentional stance priming. A hierarchical task switching paradigm of non-
social tasks and social tasks that asked participants to make  a    a  
will be used. Through this method, we will be able to analyze how social intention may influence 
task representations by comparing switch cost patterns. We predict that pattern differences across 
groups where there is an additional social intention component will provide evidence for the 
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automaticity of intentional stance. A larger switch cost is expected to be found when switching 
from a non-social task to a social task, which is believed to be due to mental attribution being a 
dominant process and thus requiring a fair amount of inhibition to suppress. When asked about a 
social stimulus, it takes more mental effort to surpass this inhibition, resulting in a greater switch 
cost. Similar tasks should be found to result in little to no switch cost and have similar reaction 
times among their task set.  
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